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ABSTRACT.  Peacebuilding is a contested concept which gains meaning as it is 
practised. While academic and policy-relevant elaboration of the concept is of interest to 
international experts, interpretations of peacebuilding in the Central Asian arena may 
depart immensely from those envisaged within the Western-dominated ‘international 
community’. This article opens up the dimensions and contingent possibilities of 
‘peacebuilding’ through an investigation of two alternative approaches found in the 
context of Tajikistan. It makes the critique that peacebuilding represents one 
contextually-grounded basic discourse. In the case of Central Asia, and in particular post-
conflict Tajikistan, at least two other basic discourses have been adopted by parties to the 
post-Soviet setting: elite mirostroitelstvo (Russian: peacebuilding) and popular tinji 
(Tajik: wellness/peacefulness). Based largely on fieldwork conducted in Tajikistan 
between 2003 and 2005, the argument here is that none of these three discourses are 
merely artificial or cynical constructs but that each has a certain symbolic and normative 
value. Consequently, a singular definition of Tajik ‘peacebuilding’ proves elusive as 
practices adapt to the relationships between multiple discourses and identities in context. 
The paper concludes that ‘peacebuilding’ is a complex and ‘intersubjective’ process of 
change entailing the legitimation of new relationships of power.  
 
Introduction 
Defining ‘peacebuilding’ is an immense challenge. Indeed the question of what is 
‘peacebuilding’, is not separable from the question of how peacebuilding is practised.1  It 
is a ‘travelling concept’ and finds new meanings wherever it visits, in Central Asia as 
much as elsewhere. The immediate implication of this statement is that the search for a 
core definition of peacebuilding may well be futile, and is at least of lesser importance 
than how ‘peacebuilding’ is variously and discursively practised within the region. The 
question is of particular importance when one considers that the transformation of these 
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practices is the very object of the idea itself. The case of post-conflict Tajikistan indicates 
that three distinct ‘basic discourses’2 of peace are present and interdependent: 
international, elite and popular. If international interventions in the name of furthering 
individual rights, safety and welfare in Central Asia are unable to engage with and 
transform state and societal practices they will remain ‘thin simplifications’ of reality in 
the region.3  The interventions of the international community must be aware of specific 
local understandings and practise constructive relationships with them in order to 
understand what may reasonably be attained in terms of peacebuilding.           
 A re-consideration is required. One approach is to rationalise the concept down to 
a narrower basis which can then be widely accepted in the ‘international community’; 
some attempt has been made in this direction.4  This approach becomes problematic, 
however, when singular rational designs meet diverse human interpretations and 
practices. A more fruitful alternative to rationalization is to broaden our understanding by 
considering how it has been practised within its various contexts. Thus, any 
comprehensive reading of ‘peacebuilding’ in a particular context requires a consideration 
of other ‘selves’:5 the different discourses in play and the various voices at work in 
popular and elite contexts. Here the distinctions in academic and policy-orientated texts 
between peacebuilding, human security and human development may be less relevant 
than the distinctions between international, regional and local contexts. It is this spatial 
differentiation of ‘peacebuilding’ among three basic discourses within a given field that is 
the focus here.  
 Based on fieldwork conducted between 2003 and 2005, the paper considers the 
various discourses of ‘peacebuilding’ in the Tajik case. In section one, the paper looks at 
peacebuilding, with respect to the case of Tajikistan, showing how it performs neo-liberal 
norms of post-conflict democratization for an international audience, despite actual 
practices which depart substantially from these precepts. Section two provides a 
thumbnail sketch of the discourse of mirostroitelstvo represented by the notions of 
‘authority’ and ‘stability’. Section three examines the popular discourse of tinji as a 
discourse of harmony which depoliticizes the Tajik social setting and seeks to avoid or 
accommodate conflict. The paper concludes with some cautionary words for practitioners 
of peacebuilding. 
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Peacebuilding in Tajikistan   
While hardly counting as a paradigmatic case, Tajikistan offers challenging insights on 
international practice. This short section offers a brief introduction to the context of the 
peacebuilding – the dominant discourse of international interventions. 
 
War and peace in Tajikistan 
In 1992, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan experienced several 
months of intense fighting and descended into civil war. Although the most widespread 
fighting had ended by 1993, a peace agreement was not signed until 1997, and significant 
political violence continued sporadically until 2001. The war and its consequences have 
dominated Tajikistan's short history. The 'Kulyobization' of Tajikistan,6 where cadres 
from the southern region of Kulyob (who had provided the troops which brought pro-
government forces back to power in late-1992) came to hold most of the key positions in 
government, despite the power-sharing mechanism of the General Agreement. This trend 
was apparently confirmed by Emomali Rahmonov's re-election in 1999's fraudulent 
presidential elections. However, Tajikistan has avoided fragmentation along regional 
lines and descent into further conflict. Government, opposition, and international actors 
have often worked together successfully to re-establish security in the country and to 
begin rehabilitating the economy. A 2003 referendum on constitutional changes, despite 
being conducted without international monitoring and with protests from much of the 
opposition, passed off peacefully and cleared the way for President Rahmonov to remain 
in power for two further terms. In 2005, international observers concluded that 
Tajikistan’s elections failed to meet international standards and included ‘large-scale 
irregularities’ amid a near consensus among the international community in Tajikistan 
that these elections were worse than the previous ones of 2000.7  As such, Tajikistan 
presents a singular case of transition from war to ‘peace’ and begs the question, upon 
what is Tajikistan’s ‘peace’ based? 
A 2004 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) argued that the 
international community looked on while the Tajik government accumulated power in its 
hands and marginalized political foes. ‘Quiet diplomacy has its merits,’ they argued, ‘but 
ignoring the problems of Tajikistan’s political development threatens to undermine the 
very stability that the international community is dedicated to protecting.’8  The ICG 
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seemed to suggest that a conservative or gradualist, as opposed to a more energetically 
liberalizing, process of conflict resolution had allowed a legitimate settlement to change 
into an increasingly illegitimate and resolutely anti-democratic institution-building 
process. This criticism goes to the heart of the dilemmas faced in peacebuilding by 
international actors intervening with liberalizing mandates. The idea that a functioning 
liberal-democratic system can be transplanted into a context lacking certain institutional 
and ideological antecedents may be a misnomer, in Tajikistan or elsewhere. However, 
peacebuilding remains the dominant prism through which the successes and failures of 
the Tajik ‘peace’ are interpreted. 
 
Peacebuilding discourse 
A large part of both official and academic international analyses of Tajikistan’s politics 
and society per se, assumes that democratisation and post-conflict peacebuilding are 
inseparable processes. Under the liberal imperatives of the international community it 
offers the promise of democratization as in Betram’s understanding of UN peacebuilding: 
‘Designed to address the root causes of conflict, it entails building the political conditions 
for a sustainable democratic peace, generally in countries long divided by social strife, 
rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states and armed parties.’9  
This reflects a discourse of peacebuilding which takes on the burden of the 
‘mission civiliatrice’ as has been well-documented by Paris among others.10  It is, he 
argues, guided by the doctrine of liberal internationalism while ‘transplanting western 
models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states.’11  This 
is manifested in the international political discourse of peacebuilding – where it is 
presented in absolute terms: ‘there is no alternative’. Thus, the concept must be 
recognized as expressive and normative, in other words ‘a way to stand for and promote 
certain ideals.’12   
 Indeed, the UN approach of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ emerged amid a 
reawakening of liberal internationalist ideals in the ‘international community’ in the 
aftermath of the cold war. However, the earlier concept of democratization can be 
considered its discursive cousin, sharing peacebuilding’s epistemological and ontological 
roots, and being hugely influential in its own right in directing international engagement 
with post-Soviet and post-colonial states. This link between peacebuilding and 
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democratisation (as well as development) is explicit in the policy literature.13  Boutros-
Ghali noted in 1993: 
 
Without peace there can be no development and there can be no democracy. 
Without development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies 
will tend to fall into conflict. And without democracy, no sustainable 
development will occur; without such development, peace cannot long be 
maintained.14  
 
Much academic writing in conflict studies reflects the general tenor of this approach and 
has served to encourage the broadening of its application across dimensions (for example, 
from the security sector to psycho-social wellbeing), time (from pre- to post-conflict), 
and space (for example, ‘the community’). Reducing long-term social and political 
change to a series of problems that can be solved, peacebuilding is a discourse that 
simulates a universal transition to democracy.  
 Importantly, the temporal broadening of peacebuilding to make it something 
which takes place over ‘generations’ creates greater confusion regarding the 
measurement of its success. This is functional for the discourse of peacebuilding as 
achievements can be claimed despite the lack of verifiable progress, and disappointment 
of apparent lack of progress in the near-term can be offset. A good example of this is the 
Human Security Report of 2005 which argues for the success of international peace 
operations. ‘Not one of the peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs on its own,’ 
the authors contend, ‘had much of an impact on global security in this period [since the 
end of the Cold War]. Taken together, however, their effect has been profound.’15  One 
could argue that this is only via ideology of the purest kind that the sum of these rather 
unpromising parts somehow mystically equates to an overall reduction in the incidence of 
conflict. However, an ideologically-informed notion of progress is intrinsic to the 
peacebuilding discourse. Such thinking reflects a dichotomy where the peril of further 
conflict can only be avoided through the promise of democratization. In this sense 
peacebuilding presents a win/lose game with political leaders and their citizens 
(somehow together) standing at a junction with a choice of two diverging pathways, one 
of which must ultimately be chosen.  
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 Public international discourse with respect to Tajikistan consciously reflects 
peace-building’s positive dimension. The UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-building 
(UNTOP) was established, according to the Security Council, ‘in order to consolidate 
peace and promote democracy.’16  The UN Secretary-General's representative in 
Tajikistan, Vladimir Sotirov, who heads the UNTOP, remarked in 2002 that, ‘there is a 
wish and will in the leadership of the country to introduce democratic principles of 
governance and development in the society, in an effort to create a vibrant civil society.’  
Furthermore he noted:  
 
I am encouraged by the democratic developments so far in this country. I believe 
if it continues to move in the same direction in the future, it will quickly develop 
into a pluralistic democracy. However, a lot of difficulties have to be overcome, 
especially in the field of further separation of powers, mass media, promotion and 
the protection of human rights, thereby encouraging civil society, reforming 
power structures, and continuing with a spirit of tolerance and dialogue in the 
society.17    
 
Such optimism is not confined to international organisations but is represented by those 
expressing the broader identity of the international community. In March 2004, the US 
Ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, remarked that he was ‘optimistic about 
democracy in Tajikistan’ and that ‘in the first instance, this is because the government 
has chosen a democratic path.’18  While these fine words may be dismissed by some as 
rhetoric, underlying such statements are peacebuilding’s axioms regarding the sustainable 
post-conflict state. Furthermore, the blurred boundary between policy and academic 
analysts means that the promise of peacebuilding is a key element of many analyses of 
the Tajik war and ‘peace’19. It has, moreover, provoked considerable international 
intiatives in terms of peacebuilding’s priorities including decentralization and self-
government in local communities, the development of a political party system and the 
carrying-out of free and fair elections, and the reform of the security sector.20   
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Peacebuilding versus ‘peace’: an assessment 
It is possible and potentially enlightening to conduct an institutionalist analysis of the 
practices (institutions) of Tajik peacebuilding. In the limited context of this article, a 
general overview of peacebuilding’s institutional impact will be attempted on its own 
terms. From its ideologically-informed precepts, the discourse often creates a ‘dual 
subject’ in conflict – the state and its citizens. Literature on peacebuilding often 
distinguishes between bottom-up and top-down dynamics concerning, respectively, the 
concepts of ‘civil society’ and ‘governance’. The latter has more recently been elaborated 
discursively as ‘state-building’, most often in American debate in the context of the 
troubled interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.21  In this context, state-building and 
peacebuilding are often labelled as ‘nation-building.’22     
 Quantitative growth in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) does not equal 
qualitative growth in civil society and in itself may indicate little more than the latest fad 
of Western donors. Is there a link between the growth in NGOs and Tajikistan’s ‘peace’, 
or is this relationship merely illusory?  What role do these organisations actually play in 
society?  Abbas notes that the discourse of civil society in Tajikistan is largely conducted 
and imposed by elites, with little consideration of ‘the personal and societal experiences 
of post-communist citizens and how those experiences have shaped citizens’ approaches 
to society and politics today’.23  The author’s own research indicated reluctance on the 
part of the vast majority of NGOs to become involved in activities that might be deemed 
‘too political’.24 In the area of small arms and light weapons, for example, some civil 
society representatives in Dushanbe feel that even beginning programmes on such issues 
might be seen as ‘oppositional’ by the government.25  This picture of deference and 
accommodation is repeated to a greater or lesser extent across Central Asia. Many NGOs 
are concerned with educational and women’s issues which are considered less political. 
They are often small, poor and badly managed, having ‘very limited’ or ‘inadequate’ 
impact on conflict resolution.26  Furthermore, as Liu and Megoran inter alia have argued, 
‘civil society’ in Central Asia expresses local and international power relations.27  The 
‘DONGO’ (Donor-organized Non-Governmental Organization) model, Liu notes, is 
fundamentally disempowering to micro-level reform and may indeed be subverted by 
local clients. Therefore, ‘attempts to encourage “grassroots” initiatives may end up 
reinforcing such illiberal institutions as patriarchy and clientelism.’28  
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The role of the political elite in the top-down processes of governance and state-
building departs markedly from peacebuilding’s norms. While the government has 
consciously incorporated the language of democracy into its legal framework and public 
pronouncements, it is unconstrained by either democratic mechanisms or a pluralistic 
political culture. President Rahmonov and his supporters dominate parliament and all the 
institutions of state. Saodat Olimova and Anthony Bowyer, draw parallels with other 
countries in Central Asia. The Tajik polity is characterized by a ‘hyper-personification of 
power’ – the accumulation of power in the hands of an elite who are in some sense 
accountable horizontally but ignore ‘the interests of the electorate by maintaining 
conditions of continual crisis.’  The functioning of the system is accordingly ‘susceptible 
to clan influence and corruption’ and the rule of law is ‘weak’. They cite the following 
democratic deficits: 
● Hypertrophy of the authority of the executive branch 
● Accelerating growth of bureaucracy 
● Weak role of parliament in the decision-making process 
● Insubstantial judicial supervision 
● Extreme fragmentation of the political, business, bureaucratic and military elites along 
ethno-regional lines 
● Overlapping of state and private interests 
● Corruption in all sectors and on all levels of government.29 
 
Given these conditions, John Schoberlein, argues that there is an observable 
movement against democratization: ‘as Rahmonov consolidates his power, he and his 
supporters are working to reduce pluralism.’30  Despite this, scope for compromise exists 
within the system and it seems inappropriate to label Tajikistan as a fully authoritarian 
system. Shirin Akiner argues, ‘the current trend is towards the semi-institutionalisation of 
power struggles among different individuals and/or interest groups, economic, regional, 
and political.’31   
It is the underlying argument of this article that the success of Tajikistan in 
avoiding further war is more than a historical anomaly or a temporary reprieve, and that 
the lack of progress in democratization is more than a matter of impatience with an 
inevitably long-term process. Tajikistan as a particular case of peacebuilding refuses to 
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abide by its peril/promise dichotomy. Moreover, its unresolved status represents a 
paradox of peacebuilding.32  How, it must be asked, did peacebuilding get it so wrong?  
Why are its assumptions about the nature of conflict resolution so inappropriate to the 
Post-Soviet Central Asian context?  The above analysis indicates that in institutional 
terms, Tajik peacebuilding functions quite differently from the model exhorted in the 
discourse of peacebuilding. However, I contend that an institutionalist analysis in and of 
itself is incomplete without a grasp of the normative and symbolic dimensions of 
practice. The following section looks at a regionally-specific alternative approach to 
peacebuilding.   
 
Mirostroitelstvo among Central Asian elites: peace enforcement 
Among most Tajiks the post-conflict period is understood in strikingly different terms 
than found in the portrayals of the international community. At regional and local levels 
dominant voices are found to deny the existence of conflict and legitimise patriarchy and 
clientelism. In my research I have come to define and explore two inter-related but 
clearly distinct discourses of Tajik ‘peacebuilding’ which are essential to the maintenance 
of of Tajikistan’s ‘peace’. The first, which I have called mirostroitelstvo, represents the 
approach of national and regional (elite) representatives towards peace and security not 
just in Tajikistan, but prevalent across Central Asia33.  
 
Post-soviet mirostroitelsvo: origins and context  
It is widely acknowledged that Russian peacekeeping challenges conventional notions of 
impartial, third-party peacekeeping, limited in both scope and duration. The interpretation 
and contextualisation of peacebuilding in the Russian speaking areas of the former Soviet 
Union are indebted to the norms and symbols of post-Soviet space. The translation of UN 
Security Council decisions and international doctrines of peacebuilding and peacekeeping 
means that more than the original English is lost in translation. While Russian doctrine 
borrows much from UN language, its practical interpretation both in Moscow and on the 
ground bears little resemblance to liberal ideals of the ‘international community’. Indeed 
the Russian term ‘mirotvorchestvo’, literally meaning ‘peace-making’ or ‘peace-
creating’, used to translate the English ‘peacekeeping’, implies a much more hands-on 
approach than that authorized by most UN peacekeeping mandates. This is less a 
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technical matter of translation than an issue of a ‘travelling concept’ which takes on a 
new meaning in a different political context. Thus, unlike liberal notions of peacebuilding 
via democratization and socio-economic development, it has come to represent a ‘neo-
soviet’ and distinctly authoritarian approach to conflict resolution.  
According to Trevor Waters, in Moldova, for example, Russian peacekeeping 
represented ‘an instrument of unilateral interference in a separatist conflict to further 
Moscow’s neo-imperialist interests’. Furthermore, Waters argues that Russian 
peacekeeping ‘allowed Transdniestrian separatists to build up armed forces and 
consolidate illegal state structures’, despite overwhelming international opposition.34 In 
Georgia, the behaviour of individual ex-Soviet garrisons was crucial to the course of the 
conflict, noting an instinctive hostility towards nationalist forces by Russian commanders 
which led to significant support for separatist forces, particularly in Abkhazia.35  Many 
analyses, such as that of John MacKinlay and Evgenii Sharov36, are careful to make a 
clear distinction between Moscow’s strategic aims, which went through considerable 
upheaval during the 1990s, and the local tactics of Russian forces, noting that much 
depended on the orientation of commanding officers. The influence of mirotvorchestvo as 
an instrument for retaining Russian hegemony in the near abroad, alongside consistent 
hostility towards nationalists among Russian commanders, played a significant role in the 
post-Soviet state formation of Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan.  
In the former Soviet Union, discourses of peacekeeping (mirotvorchestvo) and 
peacebuilding (mirostroitelstvo or mirostroyeniye) among national and regional elites are 
joined by a common understanding of ‘peace’. This is perhaps best illustrated by the case 
of Tajikistan where in the early 1990s the oppositional nationalist-Islamic forces were 
successfully marginalized as Moscow sought a loyalist to preside over a Russian 
protectorate state. Smith-Serrano argues correctly that the peacekeeping mission itself has 
become much less significant than the ‘border control mission’ along Tajikistan’s 
southern frontier with Afghanistan.37 It is under Russian protection that Rahmonov has 
been able to defy many UN and OSCE initiatives towards democratization, expand his 
personal power and re-establish a secular, authoritarian regime in Dushanbe. Dov Lynch 
provides an excellent analysis of how the inchoate relationship between Moscow and its 
commanders nevertheless served Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions.38  The character of 
Russian peacekeeping and peacebuilding raises important questions about the ideological 
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context which bonds Moscow to its post-Soviet allies in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). In this sense, mirostroitelstvo can be understood not just as an 
institutionalized approach to ‘peacebuilding’ but as a regionalized discourse of state elites 
which represents certain norms about the nature of international relations and conflict 
resolution that are altogether more ‘statist’ and authoritarian.  
 
Mirostroitelstvo as peace enforcement  
Central Asia was largely bypassed by Gorbachev’s new thinking and four out of five first 
secretaries of the Central Asian republics supported the August 1991 coup against 
Gorbachev. Perestroika and glasnost had little impact on power structures within 
Tajikistan although via Moscow they did facilitate the relative pluralism of the late-1980s 
and early-1990s which preceded the civil war. Today in Tajikistan, elites often explain a 
heavy-handed approach to political parties or the media with reference to the civil war 
and the dangers of pluralism. Furthermore it is often said that it is ‘our mentality’ (nash 
mentalitet), with reference to the former Soviet Union, that makes such ‘Western-style’ 
pluralism inappropriate. My own experience of conducting numerous interviews with 
heads of local government and state officials over the last two years suggests that two key 
concepts – ‘stability’ (stabilnost) and ‘authority’ (avtoritet) – are important in this self-
assigned mentality of political elites in Central Asia. Within the scope of this paper, only 
a brief look at the ideologically-informed usage of these two terms is possible. They 
serve to reproduce an imagined ‘Central Asian’ regional community.39 
First, the notion of ‘stability’ is typically used to explain the priority of economic 
development over democratization. As the head of an ‘opposition’ party, which is largely 
loyal to the Rahmonov administration, remarked, ‘democracy doesn’t give us bread.’40 
Here democratization becomes a gradual process which must happen in our own 
gradualist way, and can only happen after a significant level of economic development 
has been achieved. Second, the term avtoritet is often used to signify a person who has 
authority among his peers and is able to have political impact. The following quote is 
illustrative. In discussing the strength of the President’s political party, one of its leaders 
explained:   
 
 12
The position of the party became so strong when Emomali Sharipovich 
Rahmonov – a person who has colossal avtoritet! – became our Chairman. 
Why?  First, he promised the Nation that he would end the war. Second, he at 
once said that all political migrants and forced evacuees should return to the 
homeland. Third, he said, that he’d resolve the problem of hunger. That’s how 
the avtoritet of this person came about!  Our party did not increase his 
avtoritet. He gave this avtoritet to the party. [Pause] I myself am a historian. 
For example, in some countries… In Egypt. Anwar Sadat and those who were 
before him – they were given avtoritet by the party. But in Tajikistan it was 
the opposite. Emomali Rahmonov gave the party his personal avtoritet, and 
we used it and raised the avtoritet of our party. Nowadays we do everything 
so that this avtoritet is maintained and increased.41 
 
Such a view is almost always held by a state official or someone tied into official 
structures. In contrast, civil society organizations emphasize their non-political nature 
even when they are being funded by international organizations to support programmes 
which are apparently political such as voter education, gender issues or conflict 
resolution. The concept of avtoritet helps inscribe the dominance of an elite network 
which is apart from and untouchable by a donor-funded civil society sector. Together, the 
notions of avtoritet and stabilnost provide a normative basis for the processes of peace 
enforcement that are prevalent among post-Soviet political elites. As is well-evinced by 
the case of Russian involvement in Chechnya, if eradication fails to eliminate opposition 
to the elite, containment may be used until eradication is finally ‘successful’. 
In the field of international relations two extreme positions can be taken with 
regard to such contextually-located discourses. Many political realists dismiss the cultural 
context, making these ‘beliefs’ merely cynical justifications for those in power. On the 
other hand ‘orientalist’ readings – from both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ – reify such contextual 
phenomena as ‘tradition’, ‘culture’ or ‘mentality’. This article opposes both these polar 
positions which effectively serve as straw men for more serious discussions of the nature 
of culture and identity in peacebuilding. Here, opposing discourses reflect and reproduce 
‘selves’ of political and cultural identity.42 The belief in stabilnost and avtoritet is not 
simply the strategy of power hungry elites; it has a cultural resonance which to a certain 
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degree is shared by many citizens in the region, in particular those who hold positions 
within state structures, including so-called reformers. Moreover, like the internationally 
more prominent concept of peacebuilding, it is not simply analytic but also expressive 
and performative. As such it can both shape the assessments of ‘interest’ by decision-
makers and it can legitimate hard-line actions, both for an inner circle of decision-makers 
and a wider public.  
 
 
Tinji in Tajikistan’s communities: conflict avoidance and accommodation  
While mirostroitelstvo is self-consciously political, and sets strikingly different terms of 
rule than the discourse of peacebuilding, the second discourse is self-consciously ‘anti-
political’. In Tajiki there are numerous words for peace. However, the commonly-used 
notion of tinji (wellness/peacefulness) perhaps best conveys the feelings of many who 
shy away from social and, especially, political conflict. The voices of the Tajik powerless 
consciously reflect their disinterest towards, and weakness vis-à-vis, the politically 
powerful. Ironically, this gives the discourse of tinji enormous political impact as an 
essential element in the maintenance of Tajikistan’s ‘peace’. The symbiosis between 
mirostroitelstvo and tinji is based on a common understanding of the political – which 
justifies the dominant relationship of state over society. The following analysis of tinji is 
based on research conducted for the International NGO Mercy Corps with community-
based organizations (the Community Initiative Group [CIG]), citizens, community 
leaders and representatives of local government in five communities in Sughd oblast of 
Tajikistan.43   
 
Denying the existence of conflict: a harmony ideology 
Conflict largely remains unacknowledged or weakly acknowledged in Tajik 
communities. Tension (Russian: naprazheniye) or disquiet (Russian: bezspokoystvo) is 
attributed to brief arguments caused by the lack of resources. Less common is the 
acknowledgement of tension with local government or with other villages (where the 
dispute is again over resources). When asked to identify threats there was significant 
agreement between community leaders and members – with both identifying the lack of 
work opportunities and the consequent affects of unemployment and labour migration as 
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the most significant threat to peace (Tajiki: tinji; Russian: spokoystvo). Table 1 illustrates 
the answers of sixty respondents to the question: ‘What is the greatest threat to peace in 
the village?’  Strictly political or security threats were not cited at all.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
To probe this perception further it is interesting to look at the perceptions of community 
and personal livelihood. Community leaders give the impression that while circumstances 
remain difficult, the material conditions of the community have improved over recent 
years. The results from villagers are somewhat more mixed, with women far more likely 
to acknowledge poverty than men.44 However, attempts to measure personal views of 
conflict and livelihood were often thwarted by an interpretation of ‘you’ as necessarily 
meaning ‘the community’ – part of a broader public discourse of community 
togetherness. Elsewhere, this has been called a ‘harmony ideology’.45  Under such a 
worldview, community members refuse to acknowledge any disagreements or even any 
personal opinions for fear of breaking from the group. The harmony ideology of the 
Peaceful Communities Initiative (PCI) communities was particularly strongly represented 
by the CIGs.  
 
Unity and cohesion 
While a harmony ideology indicates a denial of conflict, in Tajikistan it is accompanied 
by affirmations of community unity. Perhaps, the most revealing demonstration of this 
Table 1: Perceived Threats
What is the greatest threat to peace in the village? 
Community
Unemployment 
& labour 
migration
Lack of water 
and other 
resources
Illiteracy/ 
alcoholism/ 
drug addiction None Grand Total
Koshonar 7 2 3 12 
Margedar 11 1 12 
Novabad 6 6 12 
Navbuned 2 6 4 12 
Tojikokjar 1 1 10 12 
Grand Total 27 9 7 17 60 
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worldview in my research was provided during the bilingual Russian/Tajik Strengths-
Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis conducted with the CIG in 
Novabad. When asked to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the village, and the 
opportunities and threats that they face, the CIG identified the aspects detailed in Table 2. 
In this depiction the central concepts are unity/cohesion and harmony. Strengths and 
opportunities relate to the achievement of unity, weaknesses and threats relate to 
insufficient unity. While a harmony ideology might be seen as an avoidance or even 
denial of the actual existence of conflict, it is important to recognise that such discourse 
can be, to a certain extent, productive. This is not to say that it ends perceptions of 
inequality, or stifles all tensions and arguments but it can to some extent act as to control 
what is and is not acceptable in public space, and hence serve as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2. SWOT Analysis Novabad 
STRENGTHS 
Respectful culture (Izati 
Ehtirom.Uvazhaymaya kultura) 
Unity (Yagonay.Edinstvo) 
Mutual Understanding 
(Yakdigarfahmi.Vzaimoponimaniye) 
Friendship (Dusti .Druzhba) 
WEAKNESSES 
Trouble-making (Provokatsiya/Ighvo) 
People who do not follow the leadership   
People who know head of the police and 
report lies to them about our community, 
because they are jealous of projects  
People who dug up our pipes before 
OPPORTUNITIES 
To teach the youth and direct them on the 
right path (Obucheniye molodozha i 
napravit ikh na pravilni put) 
Solving problems with mutual 
understanding and without quarrels (Halli 
muik ilotho beh zanzal va bo yakdigar 
THREATS 
Not being able to agree (Muroso nakardan) 
Some people don’t obey the head of the 
community (Ba’zeho gersh namehdeyhand 
ba raisi mahalla) 
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orahmi) 
 
 The overall theme of unity carries over into how PCI communities are managed. 
The two most common words attributed to community problem-solving are ‘cohesion’ 
(Russian: splochonost) and ‘activeness’ (Russian: aktivnost). Often they are used together 
to imply that an active community is one that coheres, and a coherent community is one 
that is active. When asked, ‘do people listen to your voice?’ the head of Koshenar 
community committee (mahalla) noted, ‘Yes, of course. The village represents one 
family, from one root (koren).’  The community leader (raisi mahalla) in Margedar, who 
served forty-five years as a brigadir from the first day the community was opened until 
1997, described, ‘Because I worked with them from the first day. All men and women 
grew up under my eyes. The people trust me and would not be able to deceive me.’  In 
Tajik villages the community is denoted as the mahalla which can be both used to refer to 
the community as a whole and, sometimes in the same breath, the head (rais) of the 
community.46  In addition the title aksakal (literally ‘grey beard’) is used for older men in 
the community who have special status as decision-makers and conflict-enders. In any of 
these variants a group of, most commonly, older men meet in the teahouse (choihona – 
which also functioned as the mosque and general community centre) on a daily basis and 
discuss the life of the village. The young and, especially, women are rarely present at 
these times. While in other parts of Central Asia attempts have been made to formalize 
the mahalla committee or equivalent body by making it an organ of local government 
(Uzbekistan) or advisory council (Kyrgyzstan), in Tajikistan the mahalla has remained 
entirely informal notwithstanding the attempts of international organizations to formalize 
it through the establishment of community-based organizations. 
 Given the nature of this ‘unity’, community members cite numerous examples of 
the mobilization of people for collective voluntary labour (khashar) prior to the 
involvement of the PCI. ‘Mobilization’ here is understood as calling on people to provide 
free labour for a community goal which has been decided by the Rais and other 
‘respected’ community members or even local government. Informal ties are important 
and there are real processes of participation in place for those of a certain standing. While 
decision-making may not be exclusively top-down, it is clear that certain sections of the 
community may be listened to more than others. A majority of men, in particular older 
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men, cite that they feel listened to, while just two out of fifteen younger women felt that 
their voice was heard in the community. However, for many people there is little sense 
that this is a problem. The CIG leader in the village of Koshonor was quite open that ‘the 
voice of women has no kind of meaning’. The women in his group vociferously agreed.47 
 
Anti-politics  
A reluctance to acknowledge conflict or dispute (raznogalsiye) and the emphasis on the 
value of unity, despite evidence of inequality, is accompanied by a further aspect of 
Tajiki tinji: a strong aversion to the political sphere. The CIG in Margedar provided a 
particularly strong example of this. ‘In our village’, one man noted, ‘peace (spokoystvo) 
is one of our strengths.’ Another man added, as if to support him, ‘there are no tensions, 
no kind of political parties.’ At this point he was somewhat chided by fellow group 
members for mentioning politics. The Margedar community leader (raisi mahalla) in a 
later interview agreed that there was no political tension. However, contrary to the CIG 
he acknowledged, ‘there are political parties but there are no contentious [sporni] 
questions between them.’48  More generally, citizens strongly express deference to and 
respect for the state – both the idea of it and its representatives. Such examples offer 
glimpses of the retreat from the political which has taken place in Tajik society since the 
numerous popular political movements of perestroika, prior to the civil war. The 
association of plural and competitive politics with war is extremely strong. Accordingly, 
the political becomes a sphere left for one united group, the ‘authoritative’ elite. This 
discursive practice of tinji is accordingly emboldened in interaction with the elites of 
mirostroitelstvo.  
 The question poised by peacebuilders is to what extent such attitudes, that I have 
presented as a discourse of tinji, are fragile pretensions which barely cover up a 
considerable anger toward the ruling powers. Is the expression of harmony, unity and 
anti-politics disingenuous?  Is the discourse merely a ‘thin simplification’ of reality?49  It 
is the author’s judgment that hatred of conflict, along with compromising and moderate 
attitudes of individuals, is sincere and reflects other aspects of the social structure and 
cultural values of Tajik society. Such depoliticized representations of the world can be 
productive in Tajikistan. They are undoubtedly politically beneficial to ruling elites who 
act to reconfirm such beliefs in their everyday practices of governance. However, they 
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also reflect a genuinely held disbelief in, and retreat from, the value of politics on the part 
of the vast majority of citizens. This is often characterized as ‘war weariness’. The wider 
context of the discourse of tinji includes, in addition to the legacy of the war, memories 
of the Soviet Union and the enormous and difficult to measure effect of the labour 
migration of hundreds of thousands of Tajiks to Russia and elsewhere.50 In such 
circumstances, the approaches of conflict avoidance and accommodation can be broadly 
effective as strategies of ‘peacebuilding’. Hence the prospects for the escalation of 
conflicts to a ‘political’ level where local authorities, organised crime or neighbouring 
regions become involved in mobilizing ethnic or patronage based groups are extremely 
low. 
 As demonstrated by the above analysis, there are profound differences in the 
practices of ‘peace’ found in present day Tajikistan and those of the discourse of 
peacebuilding which has an enormous influence on international aid allocation in 
Tajikistan. The discursive institutions of conflict accommodation and avoidance found in 
Tajikistan’s villages are confronted with strategies of conflict transformation through the 
establishment of formally democratic systems of self-governance.51 Peacebuilding, as a 
theory of transition to democracy, implicitly and at times explicitly make claims to a 
‘natural’ and universal applicability which is above or beyond ideology. However, my 
research suggests that peacebuilding represents a particular approach to peace which 
emerges from the westernised identity and neo-liberal norms of the international 
community. Peacebuilding may have an ideological quality among the international 
community, but as ‘representation of the realities of Central Asia’, its practices, 
 
become what James C. Scott terms ‘thin simplifications,’ wherein the complexity of 
any lived situation is reduced to a finite set of terms, with limited possibilities. 
Complex and indeterminate series of relationships are hypostasised into a causal 
narrative, wherein factors that do not fit, do not make sense, or are not rhetorically 
desirable are dismissed in terms of a more easily identifiable concept, ‘danger.’52 
 
Indeed in the case of Tajikistan there are numerous examples of actors within 
peacebuilding programmes stepping away from the rhetoric of their programme proposals 
in a pragmatic compromise with local institutions and ideas.53 This may be for the better. 
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Scott has warned us that when the ‘simplifications’ of ‘high modernism’ ride roughshod 
over ‘practical knowledge’ of local actors both technical ‘progress’ and immense human 
suffering can result.54  
 
 
Conclusions: the complexities of ‘peacebuilding’ 
This article has not attempted to establish a causal link between a certain discourse and 
peace but rather to illustrate the correlation between the Tajik ‘peace’ and the existence 
of multiple interacting discourses of peace (as summarized in Table 3). In conclusion it 
now reflects on the implications for peacebuilding from the cautionary tale of Tajikistan. 
 Mirostroitelstvo and tinji, I argue, cannot simply be dismissed as superficial or 
illegitimate as they both reflect and reproduce identities which have a far greater 
purchase in Central Asian societies than that of peacebuilding. It is this very context 
which has determined the limits of the discourse of peacebuilding in Tajikistan, and why 
its practitioners, in adapting to local circumstances, have often failed to practice what 
they preach. Together the interaction of discourses means that post-conflict Tajikistan has 
not proceeded directly towards democracy, a new authoritarian order or an apolitical 
society. Although today it most clearly resembles authoritarian governance, it also 
represents a hybrid, internationalized political space which superficially contains 
elements of all three. Local and international actors constantly interpret events to reduce 
complex outcomes to accord with their discursive representations of ‘peace’. Thus, 
practical forms of ‘peacebuilding’ are ones based on the ambiguities present when 
multiple discourses, emanating from differing contexts, are in debate. This debate is 
characterised not only by contentions between the ‘public transcripts’ demonstrated 
above, and simulated in internationally-sponsored dialogue activities. It also produces 
‘hidden transcripts’ as actors adapt, resign to and subvert the practices and 
representations of others.55  Peacebuilding is, therefore, neither an objective process of 
democratization nor a purely subjective category that can be interpreted in any way by 
any given identity group. Rather, it is a complex and ‘intersubjective’ process of change 
entailing the legitimation of new relationships of power. This is the key theoretical 
conclusion of this essay.  
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3. Summary Table of Discourses of ‘Peace’ in Tajikistan 
Discourse Spatial and 
Identity 
bases 
Discursive strategies Overall Approach 
Peacebuilding 
 
The 
‘International 
Community’ 
 
- Democratisation 
- Governance/State-
building 
- Civil society  
 
Conflict Transformation 
Mirostroitelstvo 
(Russian: 
peacebuilding) 
National and 
regional elites  
- Avtoritet (authority) 
- Stabilnost (stability) 
 
Peace Enforcement  
Tinji 
(Tajik: peacefulness/ 
wellness) 
Local 
communities 
 
- Denial of conflict 
- Unity/cohesion 
- Anti-politics 
 
Conflict Avoidance and 
Accommodation 
 
Tajikistan’s widely-acknowledged success in achieving an end to violence is a 
product of this ambiguity: in terms of peacebuilding it is ‘democratic’ enough to remain 
the recipient of relatively significant donor assistance and international support; in terms 
of mirostroitelstvo it is ‘stable’ enough for the government’s authority to be accepted as 
unquestionable and unchallengeable by its potential political rivals, and accepted on the 
international stage by its neighbours; in terms of tinji it is ‘harmonious’ enough for 
conflict to be avoided and accommodated, and political participation shunned, by 
millions of ordinary Tajiks. Tajikistan’s political party system provides a good example. 
The existence of six legally-registered and nominally functioning political parties is 
sufficient progress in terms of ‘democracy’ to please the international community. 
However, the fact that one of these parties operates as an umbrella for the solidarity 
group of the man who has been in charge of Tajikistan for thirteen years is evidence of 
the government’s ‘authority’ and ‘stability’ to domestic and regional neighbours. Finally, 
the near irrelevance of party politics to the everyday lives of ordinary Tajiks allows them 
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to accept the system as one which maintains ‘harmony’ and does not unnecessarily 
disturb their informal economies and social life. It is this ambiguity of ‘peace’ which 
characterises the Tajik peace.56 
 It may, to speak counterfactually, never have been possible to create a vibrant 
party system, fair elections, decentralized government, or a reformed security sector over 
the course of several years or even decades of peacebuilding in Tajikistan. Such change, 
when it occurs, more likely reflects processes of broader political and economic change, 
made meaningful by local discourses. They are neither inevitable nor irreversible. 
However, strategic interventions by informed and reflexive international actors – of 
which, sadly, there are precious few – may achieve small movements. But interpreting 
such changes as steps on the road to democratization is perhaps more a reflection on the 
ideological predilections of the author than a credible work of analysis. Strategic 
interventions in the aftermath of war should be valued in and of themselves for reducing 
the probability of violence. Most importantly they must be enacted with the 
understanding that they are contingent on both the wider context and future events 
without trying to interpret their significance through a grand narrative (such as 
peacebuilding or mirostroitelstvo) which transcends both cultural differences and 
individual agency. Such interventions are necessarily tentative and ambiguous – in that 
they are open to contrasting interpretations and enactments.  
Understanding the multiplicity of discourses in play and their cultural contexts leads 
to a richer understanding of ‘peacebuilding’. It is not that the existence of multiple 
discourses represents a problem of contradiction, but rather that this ambiguity and 
intertextuality is an essential quality of the concept in practice. The case of Tajikistan 
illustrates that effective peacebuilding interventions must be ones grounded in contextual 
particularities and comfortable with ambiguities. Grand narratives remain important only 
to the extent that they interact, are interpreted and subverted in context. As such, 
peacebuilding is essentially contested. 
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